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EPISTEMOLOGY, AXIOLOGY, AND IDEOLOGY IN SOCIOLOGY*
Michael R. Hill

University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1984, Vol. IX, No. 2:59-77

INTRODUCTION
This paper (a) presents a systems framework for conceptualizing
epistemological issues in sociology, (b) links this framework to axiological responsibilities, and then (c) locates both the epistemological
and axiological discussions within the patriarchal ideology and hierarchical power structure of American sociology. I t is argued that adopting
an activist, emancipatory ideological position obligates social scientists
to critically review their axiological commitments and epistemological
premises. Major arguments are set in italics to permit a quick scan of
the paper. These arguments form an epistemological position paper for
the closing of the Twentieth Century.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The several philosophical, methodological, and theoretical perspectives
in sociology are here conceived as knowledge-producing systems.
The concept of "knowledge-producing system" adopted here is
an analytical framework for thinking about the various sociological
perspectives. The framework is adapted from Radnitzky (1973) who
applies system-theoretic concepts to investigate differing styles of
scientific thought. He conceives of "science" as essentially "a knowledge-producing and knowledge-improving enterprise." Each such enterprise is conceptualized as a "system" composed of a set of interrelated
elements.
The terms "positivism," "empiricism," "Marxism," "structuralism," "feminism," "hermeneutics," "existentialism," "idealism,"
"pragmatism," "phenomenology," "dramaturgy," "symbolism," and

*An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the
Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois, April 18-21, 1984.
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so forth are markers identifying major orientations in sociology. These
differing perspectives are "knowledge-producing systems" which can
be identified, examined, and discussed. Further, each knowledgeproducing system can be assessed in terms of its effectiveness (either
demonstrated or potential) in accomplishing various social projects.
This schema goes a reasonable distance in clarifying the epistemological,
axiological, and political debates which so often cloud the sociological
''horizon.

There is no limit on the number of systems which m~ be invented or
proposed.
No a priori limit can be placed on the number of knowledgeproducing systems which may be introduced for discussion and utilization in sociology. It is dichotomizing persiflage to suggest that only one
epistemological conceptualization of sociology is legitimate while all
others are illegitimate. To so suggest is a premature blunder which not
only tosses out charlatans, but also dismisses serious, creative thinkers
in the same throw. The intellectual errors arising from hastily structuring epistemological debates on dichotomous lines (e.g., "science" vs.
"non-science") are divisive, unproductive, and unnecessary.
It is understandable that those who cut their sociological teeth as
positivists are not accustomed to especially wide interpretations of
"science." The positivist tradition has been so overwhelmingly accepted
in North America that any other perspective is necessarily regarded as
"unscientific." This massive acceptance of· the positivist model is the
root cause of whatever "strangeness" may be felt to lie with the assertion that alternative, non-positivist viewpoints in sociology today also
claim the "scientific" label with equal rationale.
Phenomenology, for example, makes "scientific" claims. One of
Husserl's main objectives was to establish science on what he believed
to be a foundation more solid than that on which positivism has been
erected. We are reminded that throughout his work, "Husserl's commitment to the ideal of a rigorous science never wavered" (Spiegelberg,
1971:77, emphasis added). Amedeo Giorgi echoed Husserl's foundational theme in his attempt to establish phenomenological psychology:
Through a utilization of the philosophical tenets of existential phenomenology, we are attempting to found psychology conceived as a
human science (Giorgi et al., 1971 :xi, emphasis added).

60

Epistemology, Axiology, and Ideology
Phenomenologists turn specifically toward the study of man and assert
that human science should be grounded on philosophical roots rather
different from those embraced by logical positivists.
Structuralists provide a further exemplar. It is fully reasonable to
consider structuralists "scientific" inasmuch as they are committed to
intellectual rigor and have contributed much to linguistics, cybernetics,
and our understanding of logic. Yet, like the phenomenologists, they
have been extremely critical oflogical positivism. An example is a paper
by Emmon Bach (1965):
. . . which for all its courtesy and fairness, is a severe critique of
logical positivism and the linguistic methods it inspired (Piaget,

1970:83).

Such examples can be presented many times over. The point is that
there are many alternative viewpoints in sociology which consider
themselves to be both "scientific" and non-positivist.
Nontheless, there are several sociologists who eschew the term
"science" although it would be entirely reasonable on various philosophical grounds to characterize them as "scientists." Their rejection of
"science" does not signal their abandonment of intellectual rigor, but
rather their rejection of the political connotations attached to
"science" in a society wholly permeated by the positivist conception of
"science." As a remedy, this paper adopts the label "knowledgeproducing system" to identify all perspectives, viewpoints, or paradigms
in the social sciences without too early pre-judging whether a given
perspective is scientific, scientistic, or merely stupid.

Each system is composed of three major elements: (a) metascientific
worldviews, (b) methodologies, and (c) theories.
Knowledge-producing systems have three basic components:
metascientific worldviews, methodologies and theories. These elements
are interrelated such that input through anyone element has the potential to affect the other components of the system. Although these
systems may incorporate various contradictions, they strain toward
logical consistency. This tendency is introduced by the builders and
users of the systems. Before discussing these features of knowledgeproducing systems, each component part is introduced.
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Metascientific Worldviews: The metascientific worldview of each
perspective provides the background or tradition in which
specific theories and methodologies are developed and evaluated.
It includes the philosophical groundplan, beliefs, traditions,
values, logic, and evaluative criteria of a given perspective.
In its philosophically programmatic aspects, each sociological
perspective contains an identifiable metascientific worldview. This
conception of "metascientific worldview" is more inclusive than
Radnitzky's (1973) general scheme in that "philosophical groundplan"
and "metascience" have been combined into a single element here
called the "metascientific worldview." It is less inclusive than Leinfellner's (1974) concept of "epitheory" which gives primary attention
to the "norms, values, and obligations" implied in a given theory and
systematically delivers:
. . . the background knowledge into which a social theory is
embedded and without which we may not fully understand such a
theory. It constructs step by step the whole cultural and social

superstructure or background knowledge (Leinfellner, 1974:40,
emphasis added).

The framework proposed here is in sympathy with Leinfellner's wider
aim, but, for the purposes of initial analysis, is restricted to the scientific community with which a particular perspective is associated. Axiological analysis of each knowledge-producing system necessitates
reference to the larger societal and cultural values in which each system
is embedded, but the specifically epistemological task is simplified if a
less inclusive circle is drawn around the various viewpoints in sociology.
The proposed definition of "metascientific worldview" is also
similar in many respects to Thomas Kuhn's (1970) first (as opposed to
his more specific and second) use of the term "paradigm." He suggests
that "paradigm" may be used to stand:
... for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so
on shared by the members of a given community (Kuhn, 1970: 175).

The present framework is not at odds with this definition of "paradigm." Rather, it includes specific knowledge claims under the term
"theory" and data collection techniques under the term "methodology."
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Methodologies: Methodologies are procedural rules which guide
researchers in the active exploration of selected dimensions of
social behavior and experience.
These rules are rooted in and are compatible with the metascientific worldview of the researcher. The "discoveries," "reports," or
"findings" which result from the application of these rules form the
"contents" which are the object of theoretical organization.
Theories: Theories are content-oriented conceptual frameworks
formulated under the auspices of given metascientific worldviews. They are organizing devices which reveal or assert that
selected dimensions of social behavior or experience are related
in particular ways.
The organizationa1logic of theories and the dimensions of social
behavior or experience selected for theoretical attention are influenced
by the metascientific worldview to which a given theory-builder subscribes. It is through the use of theories that sociologists claim to
present understanding or knowledge of the nature of society in general
and human behavior or experience in particular.
This definition of "theory" is more general than that accepted
under logical positivism (Hill, 1981). For the positivist, a "theory" is an
axiomatized, deductively interconnected system of axioms, theorems,
and definitions. At the same time, the definition proposed here is less
general than that suggested by Amedeo Giorgi (1975), a phenomenologist:
Theory is sometimes used in the sense of a perspective or viewpoint.
In that sense, phenomenology is a theory of science, of man, of the
world in the sense that it attempts a coherent description and interpretation of all phenomena that can be experienced by man, but it
also recognizes that it is but one among many such viewpoints or
perspectives and it does not consider itself to be a dogmatic source
of knowledge that cannot be challenged (Giorgi, 1975, personal
communication ).

Giorgi's use of theory overlaps with the above definition of metascientific worldview insofar as he calls a theory a "viewpoint" or "perspective." Still, he gives emphasis to coherent description and in this sense
his conceptualization is compatible with the ideas expressed ·in the
definition of theory offered in this paper.
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The elements in each system are interdependent.
Each alternative perspective in sociology is a "system" with interdependent elements. Radnitzky (1973) summarized the nature of this
interdependence when he asserted that the following observation is
justified:
The active researcher cannot avoid to apply theories and to adopt,
explicitly or implicitly some theoretical position. The theory-builder
cannot avoid to adopt some metascientific position, e.g., in connection with the appraisal of competing knowledge systems, explanatory patterns, etc. The metascientific position in turn will be
anchored in some philosophical groundplan, even if the latter is not
articulated (Radnitzky, 1973 :xii-xiii).

Even if it is not articulated, the philosophical groundplan embedded in
the metascientific worldview influences metascientific logic, theory
construction, and theory-guided methodological activity.

Each system attempts to maintain consistency among its elements
according to its own rules of organization and logic.
The elements in each system are interdependent in a logically
consistent manner. The nature of this "logic" is internally defined for
each system. This strain for consistency is a fundamental characteristic
of sociological enterprises whether they claim the label of "science" or
not.
Strain on the internal consistency of a system may be introduced
through any of the system's elements. Logically consistent inputs are
accommodated without producing strain within the system. However,
inputs which are incompatible with the overall logical consistency of
the system are handled in either one of two ways: (1) First, and most
likely, the incompatible inputs will be rejected so that the overall
logical consistency of the system can be maintained. Thus, discoveries
which cannot be theoretically organized, given the logic of the metascientific worldview, will be labelled "not relevant" or "errors." (2)
Second, in unusually compelling situations, the inputs may be accepted
and thus produce strain within the system. This may happen when
"errors" and "anomalies" persist and become troublesome. Kuhn
(1970) refers to such situations as "crises."
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According to Kuhn, a crisis often provides the motive force
required to produce a scientific revolution in which an old paradigm is
shelved in favor of a new framework which explains or takes care of the
"anomalies." A system in crisis breaks down and is beyond repair. In
less catastrophic situations, however, the acceptance of strain within
the system may result in a stress reducing re-ordering of the entire
system with a view toward re-establishing the overall consistency of the
system by requiring sub-revolutionary changes in each of the system's
interrelated elements.

Each system is epistemologically accountable only to its own rules of
organization and logic.
The logic of each system is internal and cannot be fruitfully
judged on external epistemological grounds. Each system has its own
rules of logic and criteria for deciding when it has produced or
improved "knowledge." This position does not, however, argue for a
state of intellectual anarchy in which "anything goes."
It is a fully proper epistemological task to question the internal
consistency of a given perspective. But, this inquiry must be accomplished on the perspective's home turf. If analysis reveals serious
internal contradictions or intellectual lacunae, the critic is obligated to
present them and the relevant theorists must get busy with the needed
repairs, if repairs are possible.
Responsible epistemological allegiance to a system requires its adherents to (a) fully articulate the elements in their system, (b) examine the
system for internal inconsistencies, (c) propose remedies for inconsistencies when they are discovered, and (d) clearly identify and publicize
any inconsistencies which prove unresponsive to diligent remedial
efforts.
It is possible and responsible to ask the proponents of a given
perspective to articulate their system, to explicate the rules of logic
they apply, and to demonstrate that their perspective hangs together
according to the rules of logic which they have themselves selected. The
critic, however, must also demand the same analysis of the perspective
to which he/she gives allegiance. The call for reciprocal and reflexive
investigations of one's adopted knowledge-producing system lies at the
heart of epistemological responsibility.
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Epistemological investigation may frequently require the excavation
and reconstruction of "missing elements" in knowledge-producing
systems.
Critics or proponents who attempt to outline a given sociological
perspective may encounter the problem that the system's founders did
not carefully articulate all of the elements in their system. Radnitzky
indicated above that the elements are not always clearly explicated or
understood by the researchers who adhere to a particular perspective.
Some of the elements may be "missing." These must be excavated and
reconstructed if the knowledge-producing system is to be seen as a
whole.
Piaget's structuralism provides an example of the need for epistemological reconstruction. Piaget (1970: 126) asserted that "structuralism cannot be a particular doctrine or philosophy" and, further, that
"structuralism is essentially a method." What is "missing" in this
example is the clear articulation of a metascientific worldview.
The guiding rule for reconstruction is the principle that the reconstructed metascientific worldview must be logically consistent with
the theoretical and methodological elements in the system. The logical
system itself must be inferred from the manner in which perspectival
advocates utilize and construct their methodologies and theories. The
critic as well as the proponent who would understand any perspectival
viewpoint in contemporary sociology should be prepared to engage
deeply and seriously in the archaeology and reconstruction of theories,
methodologies, and metascientific worldviews.
THE AXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Values are foundational for both knowledge-producing systems and
social projects.
Values are embedded inthe metascientific worldviews of sociological perspectives. There are no' presuppositionless perspectives in
the philosophical spectrum from phenomenology to positivism (cf.,
Eckhardt, 1973; Friedrichs, 1973) . Values are incorporated as presuppositions in philosophical arguments which form the highest level
in the hierarchical structure of scientific languages (Madsen, 1970).
There are no value-free sociologies.
However, the values incorporated within sociological perspectives form only one side of the axiological problem facing sociologists.
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Values also come into play in selecting the social projects which we
address from a given perspectival viewpoint. Values are superordinate to
both purpose and perspective.

Not all knowledge-producing systems are equally well-suited for every
social project.
The range of possible social projects is limited only by the imagination. A few possibilities include: prediction, control, understanding,
explanation, risk reduction, emancipation, production, distribution,
justice, efficiency, equality, revolution, stability, innovation, anarchy,
progress, enrichment, and so forth. No knowledge-producing system is
well-suited to all projects.
It would be difficult to find a phenomenologist, for example,
who would argue that phenomenology is well-equipped for the pursuit
of "prediction," "control," and "efficiency." At the same time, most
phenomenologists agree that "understanding" can be realized through
the application of phenomenology. Similar reviews are possible for the
other prespectival viewpoints in sociology.
The difficulty of such review, however, increases with the extent
to which proponents of various perspectives have failed to thoroughly
excavate and articulate the metascientific worldviews of the systems to
which they subscribe. Such failure raises the possibility of axiological
schizophrenia. Without an understanding of the values embedded in
their metascientific worldviews, researchers run the risk of pursuing
social projects with knowledge-producing systems ill-suited to selected
tasks.
Not all social projects embody the highest axiological principles of
human rights and dignity.
Matching a specific social project to an effective knowledgeproducing system is primarily an epistemological problem. On the other
hand, deciding which social projects to pursue is a fundamentally axiological issue. Axiological analyses argue that some social projects are
more defensible than others. It is one purpose of axiological analyses
(e.g., Buttimer, 1974; Caws, 1967; Eckhardt, 1973; Hill, 1977; Leinfellner, 1973) to help society identify those projects which embody the
highest principles of human rights and dignity.
Responsible axiological allegiance to a social project requires that its
supporters (a) demonstrate (through research, reflexive study, and
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group dialogue) that the project embodies the highest axiological principles, (b) seek (or develop) an axiologically compatible knowledgeproducing system to assist in realizing the project, and (c) abandon the
project if it no longer serves the highest axiological principles.
Existentially, accountability may be seen as an individual responsibility. Yet, group discussion of the issues involved in value-grounded
decisions may help many of us begin the personal examination of the
value foundations which underlie our teaching and research as well as
our selection and endorsement of various social projects. Initiation of
group dialogue is the responsibility of every social scientist who admits
that discussion of value orientation is needed and reasonable. It has also
been argued (Held, 1970) that members of a group can be held morally
responsible if they fail to organize themselves (at least loosely) in order
to discuss the most appropriate bases for decision when they find their
community or society to be in a period of imminent danger, uncertainty, or crisis.
Honestly entertained, the effort to understand the value viewpoints of others results in a clearer understanding of one's own values.
The reflexive nature of this effort opens one's own views to change and
reformulation (Floistad, 1973). Dialogue enables individuals to make
their axiological positions explicit.
Responsible axiological allegiance to a knowledge-producing system
requires its adherents to (a) articulate the specific ways in which it is
actually capable of realizing identified social projects, (b) routinely
examine this statement for the possibility of false or over-zealous
claims, (c) withdraw unsupported claims as soon as they are discovered,
and (d) abandon the system if it no longer supports social projects to
which they are responsibly committed.
It is axiologically proper and responsible to ask perspectival advocates to identify the social projects which they believe their perspective able to address. Advocates have a responsibility to demonstrate the
success or likelihood of their adopted system. Quite possibly, many
perspectival advocates who attempt this demonstration will find themselves embarassingly empty-handed.
Responsible social scientists must search for and support those social
projects which embody the highest axiological principles.
Social projects which oppress, disenfranchise, or denigrate fellow
humans cannot be legitimately supported by social scientists. This
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declaration is repeated, albeit somewhat embyronically, in the professional ethics code of the American Sociological Association (cf.,
Reynolds, 1983:143-169). We have sensed, as a group, the moral necessity to consider the rights of research subjects. The next, as yet
untaken, step is to examine the rights not just of research subjects but
of all persons who may be helped or hurt through our acts as data
collectors, methodologists, social analysts, and theoreticians. In framing
and undertaking these activities, can we do less than seek realization of
social projects which incorporate the highest possible axiological principles?

Identification of the highest axiological principles is not easy, but this
does not mean that this task can be responsibly avoided.
Axiological analysis has not been required in the sociological
curriculum. Perhaps for this reason many of us face discussions of
"values" with knots in our stomachs. We often do not know how to
proceed. We are on unfamiliar ground. Perhaps some of us fear attacks
on our motivations and personal integrity.
Axiological analysis is not easy. As in philosophy generally, there
are various axiological schools of thought. One must read, study, and
evaluate these ideas just as carefully as many of us concentrate on the
intricacies of sophisticated statistical techniques.
The difficulty of value analysis does not relieve us of the obligation to begin. At the least, we can heed the advice to find and follow:
... a good person, or at least someone who is making the effort, at
this particular time, to be good, to discover what it would be to do
the right thing (Machan, 1974:368).

Obviously, we can and will make axiological mistakes. We may be
deceived and follow the wrong lead. This is nothing new. As social analysts and theorists, we make methodological and conceptual mistakes
all the time and we also make every effort to correct our errors and
learn from our mistakes. It is time we invest the same effort in learning
from our axiological failures.

We are responsible for the axiological shape of the future.
Values are intimately bound up in decisions concerning the route
we will take toward the realization of the future. Caws (1967:54) astutely defined values as future facts:
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... they go from us to the world; they refer not to what is or was
the case, but to what will or may be the case.

Genuine values cannot be sought in the status quo although they helped
form it. Values are realized through the active choice of alternative
future facts. The responsibility which hangs heavily over us is to seek a
personal and disciplinary understanding of the base on which we are
willing to be held accountable for such decisions. It helps little to issue
a liberal manifesto listing desirable social projects and then turn around
and adopt sociological perspectives which insure that such projects are
never realized.
THE IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Epistemological explication and axiological clarification are set within
ideological environments.
Discussions of epistemology and values do not occur in abstract
isolation. They are embedded in real societies, in specific institutions,
and in particular historical circumstances. These societies, institutions,
and times are permeated with special interests and legitimations for
these interests. The stage for discussion is set within an ideological
arena.
The ideological setting of sociology is repressively dominated by patriarchal worldviews and hierarchical power structures.
American sociology is centered in a hierarchically structured
institution: American higher education. Power within this structure
generally flows from the top down: trustees to presidents to deans to
chairs to full professors to associate professors to assistant professors to
instructors to graduate teaching assistants to undergraduate students.
Academia is further dominated by patriarchy, classism, and racism (cf.,
Creutz, 1981; Hill, 1983; Maglin, 1982; Menges and Exum, 1983; Newman, 1982; and Parenti, 1980). Not unexpectedly, these patterns of
domination are replicated in the discipline of sociology (cf., Deegan,
1980,1981).
Responsible epistemological investigation and axiological discussions
are fully possible only in settings characterized by emancipatory
ideologies.
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Although explorations of values and epistemology are set within
ideological contexts, some environments are more emancipatory than
others. If the setting is not emancipatory, the debates within it are
structured and permeated by the ideologies of anti-emancipatory
interests. Such debates are designed to reproduce and extend institutional patterns which advance the interests of power elites. The outcome of epistemological/axiological dialogue in such settings is ideological debate rather than responsible, emancipatory discussion.

Epistemological/axiological debates within sociology are not essentially
emancipatory, but instead serve patriarchal and hierarchically-structured
interests in the academy and in society at large.
Mirroring the ideological context of the American academy, epistemological/axiological discussion within sociology frequently takes the
form of destructive, dichotomous debates. The dichotomies are often
exceptionally crude. Familiar oppositions include: "unscientific" vs.
"scientific"; idiographic vs. nomothetic; qualitative vs. quantitative;
contemporary vs. traditional; micro vs. macro; philosophical vs. empirical; ideological vs. value-free; applied vs. theoretical; and so forth. By
concentrating on superficial characteristics which obscure intellectual
substance, debates between dichotomized opponents generally destroy
any potential for meaningful, emancipatory discovery. Deegan (1980:2)
underscores this point: "We see that the themes of dichotomous
thinking and elite control are common threads in patriarchal sociology."
Dichotomous debates serve the interests of the status quo and must be
analyzed politically rather than epistemologically.
A nalysis of four variations on dichotomous epistemological-axiological
debates in sociology illustrate the discipline's current state of moral
poverty and intellectual aridity.
Combatants in disciplinary debates over the "correct" sociological perspective have vigorously pursued the elusive tasks of defining
the nature of sociology, explicating the meaning of "truth," and legislating the procedures of methodology. Because of the repressive ideoolgical context of these debates, however, they are framed and structured for the purpose of avoiding the serious axiological questions and
epistemological problems which should be central. It is instructive to
review the common strategies which so often defeat constructive perspectival analyses in sociology.
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The "Synthesis" Move.
A synthesis is often little more than a superficial "I'm OK,
You're OK" agreement accompanied by a series of hearty handshakes
and approving smiles. In departments ripped apart by ongoing "theory
wars," synthesis resolutions have considerable practical value. They
allow academia to "get back to business as usual" while temporarily
burying the proverbial hatchet and avoiding deep critiques. The "best
of both worlds synthesis" is soothingly political rather than intellectually engaging.
The handshakes acknowledge that the more powerful faction is
not fully able to censure its adversaries. Thus, a "synthesis" is proposed
in the interim while the various factions re-group and bide their time.
Neither side gives up its core arguments in a "synthesis." Each side
simply points out that its perspective can profitably "inform" the
other.
In the so-called "quantitative/qualitative" debate, for example, it
is common for social science departments to enter into "synthesis"
agreements in which the legitimacy of a given methodology rests partially on its presumed ability to inform the work of another perspective. In practice, particularly in departments where the quantitative
model is highly valued, this means that qualitative work is "tolerated"
for its ability to generate "hypotheses" which can later be studied
quantitatively, i.e., "scientifically." It matters little that this is not what
most advocates of qualitative research understand as the fruit of their
efforts. In terms of course requirements, a "synthesis" agreement
means that all qualitatively-oriented students are required to complete
courses in statistics and measurement theory, but not necessarily vice
versa. Quantitatively-oriented students are rarely required to complete a
qualitative methods sequence. Such one-sided requirements are evidence of the political nature of a given "synthesis" agreement.
A one-sided "synthesis" is essentially a rhetoric which permits
the less powerful, but unbeaten, faction to limp along while saving face.
The political consequences for students are not small when a politicallymotivated "synthesis" is arranged. Due to the rhetoric of "synthesis,"
students attracted to the perspective of the less powerful faction may
mistakenly assume that their interests and methodological inclinations
are valued equally with those of the "mainstream" students. It is only
later that such students realize they have been working under a serious
handicap, that they will have to do much more work on their own than
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other students, that they will not have the intellectual support of the
majority faculty, and that their work will be judged "marginal" by
those who control access to funding and other discipline-linked perquisites.
Perspectives which are not party to a "synthesis" agreement
(due, for example, to their being unrepresented by current faculty
members) still suffer ridicule, misunderstanding, and lack of support.
usually only two, dichotomous views are presented. There is rarely provision for perspectives not represented by members of the current
faculty. At best, "synthesis" outcomes are intellectually narrow. At
worst, the outcome is political rhetoric disguised as philosophical
dialectic.

The "Merely Political" Move.
Assertion that perspectival differences are merely political rather
than "real" may sometimes be more honest but runs the risk of dismissing genuine intellectual disagreements without reflexive consideration
of the issues involved. What the "merely political" and the "synthesis"
arguments demonstrate, however, is the exceptional extent to which
presumably intellectual arguments involve political issues, whether
overt or implied. The charge that one is "merely playing politics" is a
move which pre-empts all subsequent intellectual rationalizations that
one can offer. Marxist and feminist scholars, for exam pIe, are frequently accused of political maneuvering and then ruled "out of
court." It no longer matters that a brilliant case is presented for one's
perspective. It need not be listened to if the field of play is defined as
"political" rather than "intellectual."
The "Greater Moral Worth" Move.
In situations where a perspectival attack is defined as truly "political" (and not merely political), it is customary to shroud one's arguments in the cloak of "greater moral worth." This move invites
combatants to malign each other's character and to minutely question a
researcher's motivation for undertaking a given project. It is here that
the great liberal defenders of the democratic faith will "defend to the
death" the "right" of extremist, right-wing professors to malign the
downtrodden, on the one hand, while calling into question the propriety and motivations of a homosexual sociologist who plans a study
of the gay community, on the other. Questions concerning the value
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orientation of various perspectives and projects are extremely important, but they must involve something more than a brawl over who is
a "better" person if they are to be ethically responsible and intellectually engaging.

The "Epistemological" Move.
In this move, perspectival debates are "elevated" to the realm of
"rational" discourse. The audience is assured that the discussion will be
"value free" and "above personalities." When structured on dichotomous lines, the epistemological move runs roughshod over important
axiological issues and forces the field of play onto a Procrustean bed
where incompatible perspectives do not fit. (Ritzer's [1975] multiple
paradigm trichotomy is not a substantial improvement in this regard.)
A recent and exceptionally vicious example is provided by Mayhew's
(1980) attempt to divide all of sociology into structuralist and nonstructuralist camps. His dichotomizing of sociology leads to a faulty
conceptualization of both Marxism and structuralism and ultimately
results in absurd, destructive comments such as: "structuralist sociologists view social psychology as the trained incapacity to comprehend
the nature of social life" (Mayhew, 1980:357). The typical epistemological move in contemporary sociology forces debate over the
"inherent correctness" of a given approach to knowledge and understanding. One is judged as either intellectually "right" or intellectually
"wrong." Neither outcome is justified, of course, as there are no
universal grounds on which to judge the specifically epistemological
virtues of any of the current perspectives in sociology. The result is a
parade of high sounding debates which appear to have intellectual content, but which are, in fact, bereft of both sound philosophy and
responsible ethics. An essay such as Mayhew'S is not a responsible
intellectual discussion. Mayhew'S case, at least, is a rear-guard ideological attempt to legitimate the authority of a sagging sociological
elite.
Responsible ideological allegiance to a discipline requires that its supporters work for the immediate establishment of an emancipatory
environment for their colleagues, students, and partners in the larger
society.
Responsible epistemological/axiological discussions are virtually
impossible in American sociology today. Responsible dialogue is
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replaced by destructive, dichotomizing debate which prevents emancipation from the hierarchical, patriarchal power structures of this
society. Responsible emancipatory critique is suppressed by patriarchal power-wielders who control disciplinary structure, graduate
departments, and mainstream journals. We must question this situation
as we look forward to the close of the Twentieth Century. If we are to
leave a responsible discipline to the next generation, we must today
throw off the shackles of patriarchy and hierarchical oppression. If we
are frustrated and defeated in this attempt, then we must move beyond
the discipline to seek and support those few here and there who are
working to establish a truly emancipatory sociology.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing presents a systematic program for responsible
epistemology, axiology, and ideology in the social sciences. This program contains within it, however, a set of nested priorities. First, it is
necessary to establish sociology as an emancipatory discipline. Without
this initial step, responsible epistemological/axiological dialogue will be
suppressed, discredited, and penalized. Attempts to voice responsible
positions are thwarted through a variety of strategies. Thus, establishment of emancipatory environments for sociological discussion is the
fundamental priority.
Second, we must turn to the axiological dimensions of our sociological activities. The social projects which meet the requirements of
the highest axiological principles must be discovered and identified.
Only then does it make sense to pursue our third priority: the explication and construction of knowledge-producing systems which will
materially assist in the realization of responsible social projects.
We have spent too long pursuing these priorities in the wrong
order. Our library shelves are filled with the records of epistemological
debates in sociology. We find fewer volumes concerned with values and
not a few of these are devoted to expunging "values" from the sociological lexicon. What few works we find concerning ideology, we are
willing to footnote occasionally, but rarely as examples of legitimate
sociological thought. It is time to turn the tide: ideology first, axiology
second, epistemology third.
The author wishes to thank professors Mary J 0 Deegan, Werner Leinfellner, and
Helen Moore for their insights and criticisms during evolution of this paper.
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